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All over themap: A worldwide comparison of risk preferences
Olivier l’Haridon
Department of Economics, Université de Rennes-CREM
Ferdinand M. Vieider
Department of Economics, Ghent University
We obtain rich measurements of risk preferences for 2939 subjects across 30 coun-
tries, and use the data to paint a picture of the distribution of risk preferences
across the globe using structural equation models. Reference-dependence and
likelihood-dependence are found to be important everywhere. Model parame-
ters in non-Western countries differ systematically from those in Western coun-
tries, with poorer countries substantially more risk tolerant than rich countries on
average. We qualify previous findings on gender effects and cognitive ability by
showing how they mainly impact likelihood-dependence. We further add novel
evidence on the correlation between risk preferences and study major. Whereas
we confirm previous results on observable characteristics of subjects explaining
little of overall preference heterogeneity, a few macroeconomic indicators can ex-
plain a considerable part of the between-country heterogeneity.
Keywords. Risk preferences, cultural comparison, prospect theory.
JEL classification. C93, D03, D80, O12.
1. Motivation
Risk preferences have long been known to be too complex to be described by a sin-
gle parameter (Vickrey (1945), Friedman and Savage (1948)). Instead, the degree of
risk tolerance of decision makers has been found to vary systematically with prospect
characteristics. Reference-dependence leads to differences in preferences for gains and
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losses relative to a reference point. It also results in loss aversion, the empirical find-
ing that a given loss is attributed considerably more weight than an equivalent gain
(Markowitz (1952)). Likelihood-dependence constitutes a departure from expected util-
ity theory (EU ) whereby probabilities are not weighted linearly, but are subjectively dis-
torted (Preston and Baratta (1948), Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2011)).
Both reference-dependence and likelihood-dependence are integrated into prospect
theory (PT ; Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), and have been shown to be crucial to ac-
count for, for example, insurance uptake (Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue, and Teit-
elbaum (2013)) and behavior in financial markets (Odean (1998), Barberis (2013)).
In a provocative article, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) showed that many
findings in the social sciences that had been thought of as “established” did not fare
well once exposed to a rigorous test across different cultures. We present comparative
results on risk preferences from 30 countries including close to 3000 subjects obtained
in controlled, incentivized experiments. We obtain rich measurements for each subject,
allowing us to estimate a flexible version of prospect theory—a crucial element in an
exploratory comparative analysis. What is more, for two-outcome prospects as used
in our experiment, nearly all existing non-EU theories are special cases of PT (Wakker
(2010, Section 7.11)). Such theories include original prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky (1979)), rank-dependent utility (Quiggin (1982)), and disappointment aversion
(Gul (1991)).
We elicit risk preferences using certainty equivalents (CEs). Participants choose
between a lottery orprospect with fixed characteristics and a changing sure amount con-
tained between the extreme outcomes of the prospect. This serves to avoid the forma-
tion of endogenous references points (Hershey and Schoemaker (1985), Vieider (2018)),
and thus allows us to fix the reference point to zero. Together with their simplicity,
this feature has made CEs the prime tool to elicit PT parameters (Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992), Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010), Abdellaoui et al. (2011)). By changing
prospect characteristics across choice lists, we are able to introduce the orthogonality
in the characteristics of the choice problems necessary to identify the parameters of
a multidimensional theory such as PT. Instead of using the single choices from each
choice list, we then estimate the parameters by directly comparing the elicited CEs to a
theoretically derived CE following Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010).
The data reveal both commonalities and differences across countries. We find risk
tolerance to decrease in the probability of winning a prize in every country for gains
(with reflected, albeit somewhat less regular, patterns for losses). This shows the univer-
sality of likelihood-insensitivity. We also find reference-dependence and loss aversion
in all countries. The main difference consists in subjects in less developed countries ex-
hibiting higher levels of risk tolerance on average for both gains and losses. This casts
doubt on “strong” interpretations of prospect theory, which incorporate typical param-
eter values in addition to the mathematical framework of the theory (e.g., an inverse-S
shaped probability weighting function crossing the 45◦ line at about 13 for both gains and
losses).
Building on von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström (2011), we show that adopt-
ing a more flexible model does not change the conclusion that little of the individual-
level variance is explained by observable characteristics. At the same time, we do find
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stable correlates of our model parameters. We qualify the effects of well-known corre-
lates of risk preferences such as gender and physical height (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011), Filippin and Crosetto (2016)), by showing that they
mostly correlate with likelihood-dependence rather than with overall levels of risk tol-
erance. The same holds true for the effect of cognitive ability, adding to the debate on
the effect of cognitive ability on risk tolerance (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013),
Andersson, Tyran, Wengström, and Holm (2016)). We also present new insights into the
effect of study characteristics on risk preferences (which—somewhat ironically given the
heavy reliance on student samples in the discipline—have not been systematically doc-
umented to date). Finally, we can explain a large part of the between-country variance
using a few macroeconomic characteristics.
Our research is related to a number of other papers. Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper
(2010) estimated a finite mixture model for Chinese and Swiss students, finding simi-
lar proportions of subjects deviating from EU. Rieger, Wang, and Hens (2015) presented
survey data on risk preferences obtained from hypothetical lottery choices with eco-
nomics students across 53 countries. An even larger data set, comprising risk prefer-
ences as well as intertemporal and social preferences, has recently been presented by
Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (forthcoming). While containing data
from representative samples in a large number of countries, that data set relies on a sin-
gle hypothetical measure capturing risk taking behavior. Our data are much richer at the
individual level, allowing for the estimation of structural models. The two approaches
are thus complementary.
The data of Rieger, Wang, and Hens (2015), on the other hand, present at least two
major problems. First, the authors elicit willingness-to-pay for gains, and willingness-to-
accept for losses. This turns all observations into mixed prospects (Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler (1991a), Bateman, Kahneman, Munro, Starmer, and Sugden (2005)). The dif-
ference in framing between gains and losses also distorts comparisons between them.
Second, their stimuli are not sufficiently rich to allow for a full estimation of PT parame-
ters. Whereas Rieger, Wang, and Hens (2017) report an estimation of PT, they are forced
to assume a one-parameter probability weighting function and to restrict this parame-
ter to be equal for gains and losses. Such restrictive assumptions are difficult to reconcile
with the purpose of capturing between-country differences in preferences, and we will
show that both a two-parameter weighting function and different parameters for gains
and losses are needed to properly account for our data.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical setup and em-
pirical strategy. Section 3 describes the subject pool and the experimental procedures.
Section 5 presents results on the main correlates of risk preferences. Section 6 intro-
duces heterogeneity across unobservable characteristics. Section 7 discusses the results
and concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical setup
We model preferences using prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). Let
(xp; y) be a binary prospect, where p represents the probability of winning or losing
x, and y obtains with a complementary probability 1− p, |x| > |y|. We describe choices
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between such binary prospects and sure amounts of money. Under PT, utility is gener-
ated over changes in wealth rather than over total wealth as under EU, incorporating the
intuition that people adapt their reference points to their current situations (Markowitz
(1952)). Preferences are thus reference-dependent, that is, they may differ for gains and
losses relative to a reference point. The experiment was framed in such a way that the
reference point corresponds to zero (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Bruhin, Fehr-Duda,
and Epper (2010), Abdellaoui et al. (2011)). For outcomes that fall purely into one do-
main, that is, x > y ≥ 0 or 0 ≥ y > x, we can represent the utility of a prospect, PU , as
follows:
PU =ws(p)v(x)+ (1−ws(p))v(y) (1)
where the probability weighting function, w(p), is a continuous and strictly increas-
ing function that satisfies w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1; the superscript s indicates sign-
dependence and can take the values + for gains and − for losses; and v(·) represents a
utility function which indicates preferences over outcomes. Under PT, utility curvature
cannot be automatically equated with risk preferences, since the latter are determined
jointly by the utility and the weighting functions (Schmidt and Zank (2008)). For mixed
prospects, where x > 0> y, the utility of the prospect can be represented as
PU =w+(p)v(x)+w−(1−p)v(y) (2)
In order to specify the model set out above, we need to determine the functional
forms to be used. Whereas PT is very flexible, it has the disadvantage that the utility and
weighting functions can exhibit a substantial degree of collinearity when using paramet-
ric estimations in the presence of noise (Zeisberger, Vrecko, and Langer (2012)). This is-
sue becomes particularly bothersome when estimations are based on relatively few ob-
servations, which is the case when we estimate parameter distributions over all subjects
in our random parameter model. In our favorite specification, we thus assume utility to
be piecewise linear:
v(x)=
{
x if x > 0
−λ(−x) if x≤ 0 (3)
where λ > 1 indicates loss aversion, captured by a kink in the utility function at the origin
(Köbberling and Wakker (2005), Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007)). Loss aver-
sion is a central component of risk aversion, and has been indicated as the main driver
of small stakes risk aversion (Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001)), the willingness-
to-pay willingness-to-accept disparity (Bateman et al. (2005)), the endowment effect
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991b)), and the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and
Thaler (1995)). Risk preferences are thus completely captured by probability weighting
and loss aversion. While this may appear unusual to economists, it captures a funda-
mental psychological intuition about risk preferences. In the words of Yaari (1987), “at
the level of fundamental principles, risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility of
wealth... are horses of different colors. The former expresses an attitude towards risk (in-
creasing uncertainty hurts), whereas the latter expresses an attitude towards wealth (the
loss of a sheep hurts more when an agent is poor than when an agent is rich)” (p. 95).
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While utility curvature is clearly important when stakes are large, allowing for nonlin-
ear utility generally only takes up some of the risk preferences otherwise captured in
probability weighting over the relatively modest stake ranges we use (see Bouchouicha
and Vieider (2017a), for specific evidence on stake variation under PT). This simplifi-
cation further provides a good compromise between descriptive fit and tractability. In
particular, it fits the aggregate data better than alternative simplifications, such as EU
(z = 6045, p < 0001; Vuong (1989), test; all results are stable to using a Clark test in-
stead), or reference-depend models assuming linear probabilities and nonlinear util-
ity (z = 4468, p < 0001; Markowitz (1952), von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström
(2011)). A robustness check abandoning this assumption is included in the Online Sup-
plemental Material (l’Haridon and Vieider (2019)).
For probability weighting, we adopt the 2-parameter weighting function proposed
by Prelec (1998). Using an alternative two-parameter function by Goldstein and Einhorn
(1987) does not qualitatively affect our results. We used the function developed by Prelec
as it provides a significantly better fit to our aggregate data (z = 3606, p < 0001, Vuong
test):
ws(p)= exp(−βs(− ln(p))αs) (4)
where s again indicates gains and losses. The parameter α governs the curvature of the
probability weighting function, with α = 1 indicating that probabilities are treated lin-
early (the EU case), and α < 1 representing the typical case of likelihood-insensitivity.
This results in the characteristic inverse S-shaped weighting function (Wu and Gon-
zalez (1996), Abdellaoui (2000), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), Kilka and Weber (2001)).
Likelihood-insensitivity captures the phenomenon whereby a given change in probabil-
ity is attributed a greater weight when it is added to a probability of 0 or subtracted from
a probability of 1 than in the intermediate probability range. It can account for many im-
portant empirical observations, the prime example among which is the coexistence of
insurance and lottery play (Friedman and Savage (1948), Markowitz (1952), Kahneman
and Tversky (1979)). The effect of changes in α for a fixed value of β= 1 are illustrated in
Figure 1(a). Holding β constant, a decrease in α will indicate more extreme risk prefer-
ences at the probability endpoints (providing it was 1 or smaller to start with), and less
sensitivity to changes in probabilities in the middle of the probability spectrum. We will
henceforth refer to α simply as sensitivity.
The parameter β determines where an inverse S-shaped function will cross the 45-
degree line. This is illustrated in Figure 1(b) for the case of α= 065. For β= 1, the func-
tion will cross at 1e . This crossing point shifts to the left and downwards for values of β
larger than 1, and to the right and upwards for values smaller than 1. Holding α constant,
larger values of β will thus indicate a decrease in risk tolerance for gains, and an increase
in risk tolerance for losses under our linear utility assumption. We will henceforth refer
to the β parameter as pessimism for gains, and as optimism for losses.
3. Experimental setup and methods
The experiment was conducted in 30 countries distributed across all inhabited conti-
nents. The countries were chosen according to the economic importance, geographi-
cal location, and to obtain diversity across dimensions such as GDP per capita and the
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Figure 1. Illustration of weighting parameters.
Hofstede (1980) cultural attitudes scales. We used in particular the Hofstede scales in
guiding our selection of countries in regions that might otherwise seem relatively ho-
mogenous, such as Europe. Indeed, whereas European or Latin American countries may
share a general cultural heritage and similar levels of economic development, they differ
markedly on some of the Hofstede scales, such as in respect to their uncertainty avoid-
ance. Students were used in order to obtain high quality data, and because the use of ho-
mogenous population pools is generally considered desirable in international compar-
isons (Hofstede (1980)). Potential issues arising from selection effects will be discussed
below.
The data this paper is based on were first introduced by Vieider, Lefebvre, Bou-
chouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk, and Martinsson (2015b). That paper did, how-
ever, not provide a detailed analysis of the risk preference data across prospects, using
only nonparametric measures of risk preferences paggregated across probabilities and
stake levels, and focusing on correlations with survey questions devised to capture risk
taking behavior, as well as with aggregate measures for uncertainty (unknown probabili-
ties). This is thus the main paper on risk preferences in the comparative data set. A com-
panion paper on ambiguity attitudes uses stimuli included in the experiment for which
no precise probabilities were provided, and the analysis of which is not included in this
paper (l’Haridon, Vieider, Aycinena, Bandur, Belianin, Cingl, Kothiyal, and Martinsson
(2018)).
A total of 2939 subjects took part in the experiment. Subjects were generally recruited
at major public universities located in the capital or in other major cities of a coun-
try. Exceptions to this rule were Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, where we
conducted the experiment at a private university (see the Online Supplementary Ma-
terial for the exact location of the experiments). We made every effort to keep condi-
tions as similar as possible across countries. We recruited subjects using flyers, which
announced economic experiments in which subjects could earn money according to
their choices. Amounts to be won were not mentioned. In countries where we could re-
cruit through standing subject pools, we only recruited subjects who were relatively new
to experiments (<3) in order to keep conditions as equal as possible across countries.
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We tried to recruit subjects with an eye to equal gender proportions and to a wide repre-
sentation of study majors. This did not always work to the desired point—in Saudi Ara-
bia, for instance, our male contact was not allowed to interact with female students, so
that we have an all male sample. An overview of the main subject characteristics can be
found in Appendix A of the Online Supplementary Material. The complete instructions
are included in the Online Supplementary Material (for languages other than English,
see www.ferdinandvieider.com/instructions.html).
A total of 28 prospects are included in this study. In addition, 16 more prospects
were included in the experiment to measure ambiguity, and are not discussed here.
Prospects were kept in a fixed order so as to make the task easier to understand. Since
the experiment was conducted using paper and pencil, this made the organization
more straightforward, and avoided potential issues deriving from different order pro-
portions in different countries. A large-scale pilot with 330 subjects in Vietnam showed
that preferences elicited in such a fixed order were no different from those elicited in
a randomized order, while resulting in lower noise levels (results available upon re-
quest). Gains were always presented first. There were 14 prospects for risky gains and
13 prospects for risky losses, plus one mixed prospect to determine loss aversion (one
prospect being enough to identify loss aversion, given that all other parameters are
identified from pure gains or pure losses). For both gains and losses, we presented
prospects with 50–50 probabilities first, namely {50;100;200;300;3010;3020} and
{−50;−100;−200;−20−5;−20−10}. These prospects were followed by prospects
in order of ascending probability, with p = i8 , i = 1    8, offering either the PPP-
equivalent of €20 or 0 (−20 or 0 for losses), as well as 20 or 5 (−20 or −5) with the two
extreme probabilities. Losses were always implemented from an endowment equal to
the maximum possible loss, given conditional on the loss part being selected for payoff
determination.
In order to guarantee comparability across countries, we converted the payoffs using
purchasing power parity (PPP). All experiments were run between September 2011 and
October 2012. The duration of the experiment was about one hour, and the expected
payoff for an expected value maximizer was about €18, including a show-up fee of €4.
We used PPP data from the World Bank for 2010 as our main conversion tool. In addition,
we checked the conversion rates using net hourly wages of student assistants at the uni-
versity where the experiments were carried out. Adjustments based on the wage rates
mainly aided us in rounding decisions. One may be worried that differences between
countries may nonetheless be influenced by imprecisions in PPP conversions. Pilots
showed that stake variations in the range of ±20% did not impact estimated risk pref-
erences (Vieider (2012)). Another issue in international comparisons is that the “treat-
ment” of interest is given by the sociocultural and socioeconomic background of sub-
jects, for which randomization is clearly impossible. To ensure that differences were not
simply driven by selection effects, in another pilot Vieider, Chmura, Fisher, Kusakawa,
Martinsson, Mattison Thompson, and Sunday (2015a) examined the differences in pref-
erences obtained at various locations within a country. Almost no within-country differ-
ences in risk preferences were found once observable characteristics of decision makers
were controlled for. Potential selection effects deriving from using only students will be
further discussed below, based on results obtained with general population samples.
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For each prospect, subjects faced a choice between sure amounts varying in equal
steps between the minimum and maximum amount in the prospect, and the prospect
itself (with exception of the mixed prospect). The sure amount always covered the whole
range of the prospect, to avoid issues deriving from cutting off choice lists arbitrarily
(Andersson et al. (2016)). The certainty equivalent of the prospect was the midpoint be-
tween the two points where preference switched. This was meant to exclude the pos-
sibility of obtaining rates of multiple switching that differed between countries, and to
have to exclude such subjects, since imputing a preference satisfying monotonicity to
multiple switchers would require additional assumptions. At the end of the game, one of
the choices for which a decision had to be made between a prospect and a sure amount
was randomly selected for real pay—the standard procedure in the literature (Cubitt,
Starmer, and Sugden (1998), Abdellaoui et al. (2011)).
4. Econometric model
Identification
The choice lists included in our experiment were designed explicitly in such a way as
to allow us to separately identify the PT parameters introduced above, which jointly de-
scribe the risk preferences of decision makers. While nonparametric methods to mea-
sure the different PT components exist (Wakker and Deneffe (1996), Abdellaoui (2000)),
such methods are typically more difficult to administer, and may suffer from error prop-
agation because of their chained nature. Certainty equivalents, on the other hand, re-
quire structural estimations to elicit the full set of PT parameters. Under our linear util-
ity assumption, which allows in principle for a nonparametric description of results, the
fitting of functional forms permits us to reduce the number of parameters significantly,
and thus to more efficiently summarize the results.
Let us begin from our favorite specification assuming piecewise linear utility. Prob-
ability weighting can be identified simply from variation in probabilities, while keeping
outcomes constant. For gains or losses, we can write the indifference between the CE
and the prospect simply as ce = w(p)x + (1 − w(p))y. By rearranging and solving the
equation for w(p), we obtain
w(p)= ce − y
x− y  (5)
This equation allows us to nonparametrically trace a probability weighting func-
tion from the prospects offering (the PPP equivalent of) €20 or else zero with different
probabilities of winning the prize. The distance of the probability weights from the 45◦
line for the different probabilities p, given by w(p)− p, now serves to identify the pes-
simism/optimism parameter β. In particular, larger CEs in absolute terms result in more
elevated functions, which ceteris paribus indicates increased optimism for gains (since
the weight is attached to the best outcome) and increased pessimism for losses (since
the weight is attached to the worst outcome). At the same time, the sensitivity param-
eters α are determined by the way the distance w(p) − p changes when probabilities
change. In particular, the typical inverse-S shape of the probability weighting function
results from a positive difference when probabilities are small, which turns into a nega-
tive difference as probabilities increase.
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Once the probability weights have been identified, it is straightforward to identify
loss aversion. The latter results from an indifference between a sure zero outcome and a
prospect (x05; y), which gives the identity 0 = w+(05)x − λw−(05)y. By rearranging,
we obtain
λ= w
+(05)x
w−(05)y
 (6)
Since the probability weights are identified following equation (5), this directly identi-
fies the loss aversion parameter λ. In particular, holding the ratio w
+(05)
w−(05) of probability
weights constant, the smaller the absolute loss amount |y| starting from which a respon-
dent prefers playing the lottery over the status quo, the higher her level of loss aversion.
Finally, we briefly discuss the identification of the whole PT model, including non-
linear utility over gains and losses. Given that we now have an additional parameter
describing risk preferences in the pure gain and pure loss domains, we can no longer
recover the functions nonparametrically using CEs. The identification of the utility func-
tion then derives from varying the outcomes of a prospect while keeping the probabili-
ties constant. For a given probability weighting function, any change in risk preferences
must now be reflected in utility curvature. To be able to cleanly separate utility and prob-
ability weighting, it is furthermore essential to include nonzero lower outcomes in the
prospect, which serves to avoid collinearity in the parameters which would make their
separation impossible. Under deterministic choice, this serves to clearly separate utility
from probability weighting. Issues may, however, occur in the presence of measurement
noise; see Zeisberger, Vrecko, and Langer (2012) for simulation results and a detailed
discussion.
Stochastic modeling and econometrics
For a given prospect involving pure gains or losses, we can represent the modeled cer-
tainty equivalent, cˆei, under the assumption of deterministic choice as follows:
cˆei =ws(pi)xi +
(
1−ws(pi)
)
yi (7)
For mixed prospects with xi > 0> yi, we can define the modeled equivalent loss yˆi that
makes the decision maker indifferent between the mixed prospect and the status quo:
yˆi = w
+(pi)xi
λw−(1−pi)  (8)
Both the modeled certainty equivalents cˆei in equation (7) and the modeled loss equiv-
alents yˆi in equation (8) depend on the preference parameters {αsβsλ}. The difference
in the identifying equation is driven by the difference in elicitation methods for mixed
prospects and for gains and losses.
We now introduce an explicit stochastic structure. We start from the observation that
responses recorded in the experiment will be affected by noise, be it generated by errors
in utility calculation, errors in recording the answers, or from the misspecification of the
model relative to the true underlying decision process generating the data (Train (2009)).
The observed certainty equivalent cei will thus be equal to the certainty equivalent cal-
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culated from our model plus some independently distributed error term or cei = cˆei+i.
We assume this error to be normally distributed, i ∼N (0σ2i ). The parameter σi indi-
cates the standard deviation of a so-called Fechner error (Hey and Orme (1994), Loomes
and Sugden (1995), Loomes (2005)).
We allow for three different types of heteroscedasticity following Bruhin, Fehr-Duda,
and Epper (2010). First, the error is allowed to differ between gains and losses. We define
the error parameter for losses as the sum of the error parameter for gains plus a domain-
specific error component ω. For mixed prospects, we adopt the error for losses, since it
is the loss amount that varies in the mixed choice lists. Second, we allow the error term
to depend on the specific prospect, or rather, on the difference between the high and
low outcome in the prospect, such that σsi = σs|xi − yi|. For the mixed prospects, the
error term depends on the maximum range in the loss domain. This takes into account
that the error may be related to the length of the choice list, which will vary with the
difference between the two outcomes of the prospect given fixed steps between the sure
amounts. Finally, we let the error term σ depend linearly on the characteristics of the
decision maker, n, so that σs = σ0 +Xnη, with η a vector of regression parameters. This
specification performs significantly better than a homoscedastic specification accord-
ing to a likelihood ratio test (χ2(1)= 1460376, p< 0001).
We can express the probability density function ψ(·) for a given subject n and
prospect ξi as follows:
ψ(θnξi)=φ
(
cˆeni
(
αsnβ
s
nλn
)− ceni
σnis
)
 (9)
where φ is the standard normal density function, and θn = {αsnβsnλnσnω} indicates
the vector of model parameters. The s = + index is omitted from the parameter σn for
notational convenience. For mixed prospects, cˆei and cei have to be replaced by yˆi and
yi, respectively, in equation (9).
The individual likelihood function is equal to the product of the density functions
above across all prospects:
Ln(θn)=
∏
i
ψ(θnξi) (10)
Taking logs and summing over individuals, we obtain the following aggregate log-
likelihood function:
LL(θkγ)=
N∑
n=1
log
[
Ln(θn)
]
 (11)
Within this grand likelihood, we let the vector of parameters depend linearly on the ob-
servable characteristics of decision makers, such that θn = θk +Xnγ, where θk is a vec-
tor of constants and Xn represents a matrix of observable characteristics of the decision
maker. For simplicity, the parameter ω is assumed to be independent of the character-
istics of the decision maker.
We use a random parameter model to take into account unobserved heterogeneity in
addition to the observed heterogeneity captured by γ in the model above. This amounts
to estimating the distribution of the parameters θn from the aggregate data. We make
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two assumptions here. First, we transform the parameters using an exponential func-
tion, thus imposing that all parameters be positive.1 Second, we assume the parameter
distributions based on unobservable characteristics to be normally distributed, inde-
pendent of the observable characteristics, and independent of each other. This amounts
to assuming that ζ, the vector of random parameters, follows a multivariate normal dis-
tribution with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix Ω = ΣΣ′.2 Conditional on a
given realization of ζ, the contribution to the likelihood for subject n is given by equa-
tion (10). The unconditional contribution to the likelihood for subject n is
Ln(θkγΣ)=
∫
R6
∏
i
ζ(θnξi)f (ζ|Ω)dζ (12)
where f (·) denotes the multivariate normal distribution, and the dimension of the inte-
gral corresponds to the number of parameters to be estimated. Taking logs and summing
over individuals give the aggregate log-likelihood function to be maximized.
We estimate the log-likelihood function (11) in Stata using standard estimation tech-
niques, and use it to determine the effects of observable characteristics in Sections 5.1–
5.4. The errors are always clustered at the subject level. Because the multiple integral
in equation (12) does not have a closed-form solution, we estimate the log-likelihood
function by maximum-simulated likelihood. The estimation is performed in Matlab us-
ing Halton sequences of length 500 per individual.3 We use it to represent heterogeneity
across unobservable characteristics in Section 6. All estimations employ the BFGS algo-
rithm.
5. Results
We present the results in four stages. We start by presenting aggregate estimates for our
global data. We then move on to the between-country comparison. This involves show-
ing differences between countries, as well as trying to determine possible factors ex-
plaining such differences. The third stage looks at individual-level correlates controlling
for country fixed effects. Stage four then takes a look at overall heterogeneity and the ex-
tent to which the latter can be explained through individual and country characteristics.
5.1 Global estimates
We start by presenting the global estimates of our preference functions. This establishes
a benchmark of “globally representative preference parameters,” albeit for students only.
The probability weighting functions for gains and losses are shown in Figure 2. For
1For example, the error term sigman for a decision maker n is defined as exp(ξiσ +Xnη), for an individual
effect ξiσ capturing unobserved heterogeneity.
2This specification does not allow for correlation across individual-specific parameters, which is a limita-
tion of our approach. This limitation is justified by computational reasons. Relaxing this hypothesis would
require imposing additional assumptions (e.g., identity of parameters between gains and losses, impos-
ing a one-parameter form for the probability weighting function, or restricting the impact of observable
heterogeneity) in order keep the number of estimated parameters reasonable.
3Morokoff and Caflisch (1995) showed that Halton sequences give the best performance in terms of in-
tegration error for multiple integrals with dimensions up to 6 (see also Train (2009), on Halton sequences).
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Figure 2. Probability weighting functions for gains and losses based on the global data.
both gains and losses, we find considerable likelihood-insensitivity, with α+ = 0602
(se = 0005) and α− = 0641 (se = 0006). In terms of pessimism for gains and optimism
for losses, we find β+ = 0908 (se = 0003) and β− = 0941 (se = 0004). Although the pa-
rameters are significantly different between gains and losses from a statistical point of
view, the two functions can be seen to be economically very similar. This is an indica-
tion of reflection at this highest level of aggregation, resulting in risk seeking for small
probability gains and large probability losses, and in risk aversion for small probability
losses and large probability gains. We furthermore find clear evidence for loss aversion,
with λ= 1939 (se = 0017) being close to, but slightly below, the often-cited benchmark
value of 2.
5.2 Between-country differences
We next show differences between countries. The effects shown are based on a regres-
sion with country dummies and a female dummy, added because the proportion of
females differs across countries (gender effects in our data will be discussed below).
Figure 3(a) shows some typical probability weighting functions for gains. The USA dis-
plays the pattern hitherto thought of as typical—small probabilities are overweighed,
moderate to large probabilities underweighted, and the function crosses the 45◦ line at
around 03 (Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Abdellaoui (2000), Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker
(2001)). While China only displays slightly less pessimism than the US (consistent with
the results of Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010)), other countries such as Vietnam,
Ethiopia, or Nicaragua have much lower degrees of pessimism.4 The pattern here is one
4If we allow for utility curvature in addition to probability weighting, this pattern is still captured mostly
in the weighting function, and not in the utility function; see the Online Supplementary Material for a de-
tailed stability analysis.
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Figure 3. Probability weighting functions for gains.
of increased risk tolerance, which reaches up to well beyond the midpoint of the proba-
bility scale.5
5The Online Supplementary Material provides additional analyses in this respect, including graphs
showing pairwise comparison of countries with confidence bands, to show that we indeed find significant
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Figure 3(b) shows a scatter plot of the sensitivity and pessimism parameters. All
countries show likelihood-insensitivity, with a sensitivity parameter below 09. Most sen-
sitivity parameters are also at or above 05, with the exception of Nigeria. In terms of the
pessimism parameter, Germany, Australia, and the US are the countries with the highest
parameter values. They are then followed mostly by other industrialized countries such
as Spain, Belgium, and Japan (although India is also far to the right). The next group
to the left, roughly between a value of 08 and 09, is constituted mostly by middle in-
come countries such as Brazil, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Vietnam (and with the UK as an
exception to the middle income rule). The least pessimistic group to the far left is consti-
tuted by low-income countries such as Ethiopia, Peru, Nicaragua, and Nigeria. We find
a marginally significant correlation between the sensitivity and pessimism parameters
(ρ = 0356, p = 0054, Spearman rank correlation), going in the direction of more pes-
simistic countries exhibiting higher sensitivity.
Figure 4(a) shows typical weighting functions for losses. The patterns are less regular
than for gains. In the US and China, we again find a pattern of overweighting of small
probabilities (now indicating risk aversion) and underweighting of large probabilities
(indicating risk seeking), although the function appears to be somewhat flatter than for
gains. Guatemala shows a pattern of mild risk seeking throughout. Ethiopia and Cambo-
dia, on the other hand, have low sensitivity, which leads to substantial risk aversion for
small probabilities and strong risk seeking for moderate to large probabilities. The find-
ings are consistent with the consensus in the literature that there is less regularity for
losses than for gains (Abdellaoui (2000)); especially the data for Ethiopia and Cambodia
appear to depart somewhat from previously observed functions.
Figure 4(b) shows the parameters of the weighting function for losses in a scatter
plot. Once again, most countries have sensitivity parameters between 09 and about 05.
The exceptions to this rule are Guatemala, which has an almost linear function, and
Cambodia and Nigeria, which exhibit extremely low sensitivity. The results for Australia
show low levels of optimism, now indicated by its position to the very left in the graph. As
observed for gains, there appears to be again a general tendency for poor and medium
income countries to display more optimism than WEIRD countries. This tendency is,
however, much less clear than for gains. We find no correlation between the optimism
and sensitivity parameters (ρ= −0178, p= 0347).
5.3 Economic indicators
Having established the main differences between countries, it is now at the time to see
whether we can find some systematic relations. Prime candidates for the explanation
of the differences discussed above are measures of income. Table 1 regresses the pa-
rameters of the structural model on GDP (measured as the difference of per capita GDP
from the US, the richest country in our sample, in logs) and the Gini coefficient (nor-
malized so that it is 0 for the US) as an indicator of income inequality. The regression
also controls for whether a participant is a self-declared national of the country or not
differences in terms of risk tolerance, and not only in terms of the parameters of the weighting function
(which require a ceteris paribus interpretation that is not always warranted based on the empirical data).
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Figure 4. Probability weighting functions for losses.
(foreigner). We further control for gender, which will be discussed below (the results
are also stable to inserting additional demographic controls). Finally, we use a dummy
to indicate whether the experiment was executed at a private university (equal to 1 for
Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia), and a dummy to indicate countries that are
members of the petroleum-producing cartel OPEC. Private-university students may be
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Table 1. Effects of income measures on risk preferences.
N = 2939, LL = −217069 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GDP difference −0058∗∗∗ −0063∗∗∗ −0095∗∗∗ 0032∗∗∗ 0194∗∗∗ 0032∗∗∗
(0007) (0006) (0008) (0007) (0024) (0002)
Foreigner 0026 −0000 −0006 0027 −0003 0018∗∗
(0034) (0031) (0040) (0029) (0081) (0007)
Gini coefficient 0012 0009 0039∗∗∗ 0008 −0010 0001
(0008) (0007) (0008) (0007) (0022) (0002)
Private university 0013 −0064∗∗∗ −0047 −0042∗ 0091 −0000
(0027) (0022) (0032) (0025) (0080) (0005)
OPEC −0264∗∗∗ −0145∗∗∗ −0270∗∗∗ −0055 0432∗∗∗ 0065∗∗∗
(0031) (0025) (0031) (0034) (0149) (0006)
Female dummy      
Constant 0777∗∗∗ 1010∗∗∗ 0877∗∗∗ 0914∗∗∗ 1611∗∗∗ 0157∗∗∗
(0014) (0013) (0016) (0012) (0042) (0004)
Note: ∗ p < 010, ∗∗ p < 005, ∗∗∗ p < 001. GDP difference indicates the difference of GDP per capita from the US in logs,
that is, relative poverty. GDP data are from the World Bank tables for 2011, measured in purchasing power parity. The Gini
coefficient is the most recent before 2011 available; source: World Bank and CIA Factbook.
expected to come from relatively wealthier families, so that we would expect them to be
relatively more risk tolerant due to the positive correlation between income and risk tol-
erance generally found within countries (see Hopland, Matsen, and Strøm (2016) for a
review of this correlation).6 The OPEC dummy marks oil producing countries, in which
GDP deriving from oil production does generally not accrue to the general population
(this is standard in macroeconomic accounts of income levels; see, e.g., Ashraf and Galor
(2011), Olsson and Hibbs (2005)).
We start by discussing the effects of GDP per capita. Sensitivity decreases with
poverty for both gains and losses, whereas noise increases. Poorer countries exhibit less
pessimism for gains, as well as more optimism for losses. Poor countries also tend to
exhibit higher levels of loss aversion than rich countries. Being a foreigner in a country
shows no effect on risk preferences. Income distribution as measured by the Gini coef-
ficient, on the other hand, shows a strong and highly significant effect on sensitivity for
losses, with more unequal countries exhibiting higher sensitivity. Subjects from private
universities show lower pessimism for gains, and lower optimism for losses (marginally
significant). OPEC countries have lower sensitivity for both gains and losses. They are
also less pessimistic for gains, while at the same time exhibiting higher noise levels. In
other words, they display the decision patterns typical of poorer countries as hypothe-
sized, with effects aligned with those of relative poverty.
We may wonder whether the results presented here are stable. In particular, the cor-
relation with GDP may be suspected of proxying for other variables. We tested this by
adding a number of variables to the above regression: (i) geographical variables, such as
absolute latitude and whether a country is landlocked, as well as continental dummies
6This being a student subject pool, we have no measures of income at the individual level. We tried
instead to obtain measures of stipends and expenses, however, the latter are extremely noisy, and thus not
very informative, so that we prefer not to report them here.
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(Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999)); (ii) a variety of variables indicating institutional
quality (Keefer and Knack (1997)); (iii) dummies indicating legal origins (Porta, Lopez-
de Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)); and (iv) data on the genetic diversity within each country
(Ashraf and Galor (2013)). GDP per capita remains highly significant in all of the regres-
sions. The other variables at best show weak effects on risk preferences; the full regres-
sions can be found in the Online Supplementary Material. Analyzing the risk preference
data reported in Falk et al. (forthcoming) at the macroeconomic level, Becker, Dohmen,
Enke, and Falk (2015) report a strong correlation with genetic diversity (and only a much
weaker correlation with GDP). This is exactly the inverse of our findings. This discrep-
ancy may well be due to the fact that a question about one’s “willingness to take risk”
captures more than just risk preferences (Vieider et al. (2015b)). We do indeed find a cor-
relation of genetic difference measures with ambiguity attitudes (l’Haridon et al. (2018)),
which may thus reconcile these differences in findings.
The data just presented could be driven by systematic selection effects. If students
in poorer countries come systematically from relatively richer families, that may explain
the strong correlation with GDP per capita. This appears not to be an issue in prac-
tice. Several papers have tested the difference between students and general popula-
tion samples, generally finding no or only minor differences in aggregate risk prefer-
ences between these samples (see, e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2010)
for Denmark, and Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012), for Switzerland). We have furthermore
carried out a precise test of selection effects in our sample. Vieider, Beyene, Bluffstone,
Dissanayake, Gebreegziabher, Martinsson, and Mekonnen (2018) report data from an
experiment conducted using the same type of tasks as employed in this paper with a
representative sample of the rural population of Ethiopia—the poorest country in our
sample and one of the most risk tolerant. The results clearly showed that the rural sam-
ples showed similar risk attitudes to the Ethiopian student sample. At the same time, the
rural Ethiopian population sample was found to be more risk tolerant than our Western
samples (see also Vieider, Truong, Martinsson, and Pham Khanh (forthcoming) and Di
Falco and Vieider (2018), for further evidence). This clearly rejects an explanation based
on systematic selection.
5.4 Individual characteristics
Table 2 shows the effects of physical characteristics, in particular, gender, age, and
height, while controlling for country effects using dummies. A large number of stud-
ies both in the economic laboratory and in the field have found gender differences in
risk taking behavior (Eckel and Grossman (2008)). There remain some doubts whether
gender effects are universal or whether they may vary between countries (Croson and
Gneezy (2009)), and on the extent to which they may be task-specific (Filippin and
Crosetto (2016)). We add to this discussion by showing evidence from a number of differ-
ent countries, and by examining regularities over the probability and outcome spaces.
We find women to display significantly lower sensitivity than men for both gains and
losses. At the same time, women exhibit significantly higher noise levels. For gains, we
also find women to be more pessimistic than men, although this effect is relatively small.
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Table 2. Effects of physical characteristics on risk preferences.
N = 2939, LL = −214201 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
Female −0092∗∗∗ 0036∗∗ −0072∗∗∗ −0021 −0040 0011∗∗∗
(0018) (0016) (0020) (0016) (0052) (0004)
Age −0008 0002 0009 0016∗∗ 0018 0009∗∗∗
(0009) (0008) (0009) (0008) (0022) (0002)
Height 0026∗∗ −0005 0017 0019∗∗ −0009 −0005∗∗
(0010) (0009) (0011) (0009) (0029) (0002)
Country fixed effects      
Constant (USA) 0767∗∗∗ 1052∗∗∗ 0863∗∗∗ 0934∗∗∗ 1616∗∗∗ 0161∗∗∗
(0032) (0028) (0038) (0027) (0088) (0007)
Note: ∗ p< 010, ∗∗ p< 005, ∗∗∗ p< 001; age and height are z-scores z-scores are used for age and height.
Given the relatively narrow age range in our sample, we are reluctant to over-
interpret the effect found. We replicate recent findings of physical height correlating
with risk preferences (Dohmen et al. (2011)). This effect goes in the direction of taller
people exhibiting higher sensitivity, although this effect is significant only for gains. For
losses, taller people are found to be more optimistic. Finally, taller people also have lower
noise levels in their decision processes. It is not entirely clear why such effects are found
for taller people. One hypothesis is that physical height, or rather its lack, may reflect dis-
eases and socioeconomic conditions in childhood (Peck, Nyström, and Lundberg (1995),
Maccini and Yang (2009), Dercon and Porter (2014)).
Table 3 shows the effects of study major and grade point average (GPA; normalized
to the same scale across countries and transformed into z-scores). GPA shows the ef-
fects we would expect to see using it as an—albeit imperfect—proxy for cognitive ability.
A higher GPA is correlated with increased sensitivity for both gains and losses, as well as
reduced noise levels. This is consistent with interpretations of likelihood-insensitivity as
a rationality failure (Tversky and Wakker (1995), Wakker (2010)). A higher GPA also cor-
relates with lower levels of loss aversion. This is consistent with studies that have found
that loss aversion is reduced among professional traders (List (2004)), and with studies
that have found debiasing mechanisms such as asking subjects to give reasons for their
choices to result in lower loss aversion (Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2012)). We also
find a marginally significant positive correlation of GPA with pessimism for gains. This
correlation runs counter to accounts of risk aversion resulting from low cognitive ability
(Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013)), but is consistent with recent criticisms of that
literature (Andersson et al. (2016)).
We also find significant effects of study major as measured against economics stu-
dents. We find hardly any differences in risk preferences for students of mathematics
and engineering, the natural sciences, or medicine. The differences obtained for stu-
dents of the social sciences, the humanities, arts, and other study majors (made up
mostly by law students) appear, on the other hand, to be systematic. There is a gen-
eral tendency among these majors to display lower sensitivity. At the same time, they
are more prone to errors or noise. We hypothesize that these effects are due to a lower
exposure to formal mathematics, or a selection into these disciplines based on lower
mathematical ability.
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Table 3. Effects of study major on risk preferences.
N = 2939, LL = −2138628 α+ β+ α− β− λ σ
GPA 0028∗∗∗ 0013∗ 0042∗∗∗ −0006 −0054∗∗ −0007∗∗∗
(0008) (0008) (0009) (0008) (0024) (0002)
Math and engineering 0005 −0008 0031 0027 −0069 −0004
(0022) (0020) (0025) (0020) (0068) (0005)
Natural sciences −0041 0007 −0070∗∗ −0029 −0101 0007
(0030) (0026) (0034) (0025) (0086) (0006)
Medicine 0026 0000 −0016 −0053 −0113 −0001
(0041) (0037) (0049) (0037) (0087) (0008)
Social sciences −0095∗∗∗ 0026 −0097∗∗∗ −0019 −0027 0018∗∗∗
(0028) (0024) (0030) (0024) (0071) (0005)
Humanities −0077∗∗ 0001 −0022 0011 0018 0018∗∗∗
(0031) (0030) (0037) (0027) (0091) (0007)
Arts −0041 −0052 −0123∗∗ 0011 0176 0022∗∗
(0051) (0040) (0050) (0050) (0156) (0009)
Study other −0068∗∗∗ 0016 −0048∗ −0016 −0045 0017∗∗∗
(0024) (0022) (0027) (0022) (0065) (0005)
Physical characteristics      
Country dummies      
Constant 0777∗∗∗ 1038∗∗∗ 0858∗∗∗ 0947∗∗∗ 1705∗∗∗ 0159∗∗∗
(0035) (0032) (0041) (0031) (0101) (0008)
Note: ∗ p< 010, ∗∗ p< 005, ∗∗∗ p< 001; social sciences exclude economics students, who serve as reference.
Finally, we can address the effect of cultural variables on risk preferences. Some of
the previous literature has emphasized accounts based on survey measures of cultural
attitudes (Hofstede (1980)). For instance, Weber and Hsee (1998) compared four coun-
tries using hypothetical certainty equivalents for 50–50 prospects. They organized the
results using the individualism-collectivism dimension, and concluding that relatively
collectivistic societies such as China or Poland exhibit lower risk aversion compared to
Germany and the US because of the implicit insurance provided by the closer social fab-
ric. Notice, however, how their findings are also consistent with GDP differences. Rieger,
Wang, and Hens (2015) explained risk preferences obtained in a survey with economics
students in a large number of countries mostly based on uncertainty avoidance, another
of the Hofstede cultural scales. In a companion paper, Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2016)
explain cross country differences in loss aversion again through the Hofstede scales, al-
though in this case it is mostly through masculinity and individualism. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, we find virtually no explicative power of Hofstede’s cultural scales; details are
provided in the Online Supplementary Material.
Another cultural dimension that has received some attention in the literature on risk
preferences is religious affiliation. Results obtained so far are not consistent. Some re-
searchers have concluded that Protestants are less risk averse than Catholics (Dohmen
et al. (2011)), while others have reached the opposite conclusion (Noussair, Trautmann,
van de Kuilen, and Vellekoop (2013)). There is little evidence on religions other than the
Judeo-Christian ones prevalent in the West. We find no difference between Catholics
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and Protestants in our data. While we find some differences for other religious affilia-
tions, such as, for example, Jews being less risk averse than Protestants for gains (see
also Barsky, Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro (1997)), these correlations are not systematic
and likely spurious. The regressions and a discussion of the results are presented in the
Online Supplementary Material.
6. Explained and unexplained heterogeneity
In this last section of the results, we take a closer look at overall preference heterogeneity
based on our random parameter estimates described in equation (12). We thereby focus
on developing intuition based on graphs of parameter distributions, and on discussing
the most important insights deriving from this analysis. More detailed statistical results
can be found in the Online Supplementary Material.
We start by discussing overall heterogeneity in risk preferences, and in particular
likelihood-dependence and reference-dependence. We find considerable heterogeneity
for all preference parameters. Likelihood-insensitivity appears to be the norm. For gains,
the distribution implies that 82% of our subjects have a sensitivity parameter below 1,
with only 12% of subjects characterized by a sensitivity value close to 1 (i.e., withα+ lying
in the range [09;11]). For losses, 76% of the population have a sensitivity parameter
below 1 and 14% of subjects have a sensitivity value close to 1. We also find considerable
heterogeneity in loss aversion. The parameter estimates correspond to a distribution
with a median value of 2, very close the value estimated above.7 This distribution implies
that 94% of the loss aversion parameters fall in the range [1;5], and corresponds to the
usual benchmarks used in the literature (Barberis (2013)).
We now proceed to comparing the overall heterogeneity in preference parameters
estimated across all individuals to formulations of our random parameter model that
allow us to visualize heterogeneity across observable characteristics. We proceed as fol-
lows. We start by estimating a model with only country dummies to capture differences
between countries. By definition, such a model captures all of the between-country vari-
ance. We then use this model as a benchmark case to discuss individual and macroeco-
nomic characteristics. In particular, we are interested in how much more of the overall
heterogeneity in preference parameters we can explain by adding a large set of observ-
able individual characteristics. When it comes to the macroeconomic characteristics,
our interest lies in how much of the heterogeneity captured by country dummies can be
explained when using a smaller number of country characteristics such as GDP instead.
Figure 5 compares the heterogeneity captured by the country dummies to the het-
erogeneity captured by country dummies plus individual characteristics. The outermost
curves represent the overall heterogeneity in the two estimations.8 Adding country dum-
mies by definition explains all of the heterogeneity across countries. The proportion of
7The Online Supplementary Material reports correlations between the point estimates at the country
level using the approach from the first part of the median values obtained from the random parameter
estimates at the same level, and shows that they are highly correlated. This proves the consistency of the
two approaches.
8There are two such curves, corresponding to the estimations with and without individual characteristics
added. The two differ slightly, and we show them both for reasons of precision. The two curves, however,
can be seen to largely coincide, and indeed there are no significant differences between them.
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Figure 5. Observable versus unobservable heterogeneity, individual characteristics. Dashed
lines are estimated parameter distributions taking observed and unobserved heterogeneity into
account. Solid lines represent the observed heterogeneity only and neglect the unobserved part.
Densities are kernel density estimates over individuals.
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overall heterogeneity explained by the country dummies remains, however, quite mod-
est. This shows that there is more heterogeneity across individuals than across coun-
tries, albeit with quantitative differences across parameters. The country dummies cap-
ture relatively little of the overall heterogeneity for the pessimism/optimism parameters,
with 133% of the variance in pessimism for gains explained by the country dummies,
and only 64% of the variance in optimism for losses. This increases to over 30% for the
sensitivity parameters, with similar figures obtaining for loss aversion and noise.
Further adding individual characteristics to the regression does not increase the
explained variance by much, as is apparent from Figure 5. Notwithstanding our more
flexible model, which can account for a richer array of within-subject heterogeneity
through reference-dependence and likelihood-dependence, our conclusions thus re-
main remarkably similar to those reached by von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström
(2011). Observable characteristics at the individual level contribute little to explaining
overall heterogeneity in risk preferences.
This narrative changes once we start examining to what extent we can explain
between-country heterogeneity recurring to a few macroeconomic indicators rather
than to country-specific dummies. Specifically, we will use the macroeconomic indi-
cators used above, that is, GDP per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the private univer-
sity and OPEC dummies. We also control for female since the proportion of females in
the experiment differs between countries. Figure 6 shows the distribution of param-
eters estimated based on macroeconomic indicators, and again compares this to the
benchmark of heterogeneity captured by country dummies. Just like above, the outer-
most curves represent the overall heterogeneity in the two estimations, while the peaked
curves correspond to distributions of preference parameters implied by the observed
covariates only. Comparison between the two peaked curves shows what is lost in terms
of explained heterogeneity when moving from country dummies to macroeconomics
indicators.
While obviously capturing less heterogeneity than the country dummies, the macro-
economic variables capture a substantial part of that heterogeneity, ranging from 43% to
70% of the heterogeneity captured by country dummies. Once again, this exercise is least
successful for pessimism and optimism, although still capturing more than half of the
variance captured by country dummies for pessimism and close to 40% for optimism
(see the Online Supplementary Material for the exact figures). This stands in contrast
to the effect found for the individual characteristics. We thus conclude that while the
characteristics we observe at the individual level explain only a very small part of the
overall heterogeneity between individuals, macroeconomic characteristics pick up on
most of the between country differences.
7. Conclusion
We used data from 30 countries and 2939 subjects to systematically examine differences
in risk preferences across individuals and countries. Notwithstanding the flexible de-
scriptive model of choice under risk, observable characteristics were found to explain
little of the total heterogeneity in preference parameters. This may be an indication that
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Figure 6. Observable versus unobservable heterogeneity, country-specific dummies and
macroeconomic indicators. Light lines are estimated parameter distributions taking observed
and unobserved heterogeneity into account. Dark lines represent the observed heterogeneity
only and neglect the unobserved part. Densities are kernel density estimates over individuals.
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risk preferences constitute an individual trait that is largely independent of observable
characteristics of the decision maker. Macroeconomic characteristics of countries, on
the other hand, could capture a large proportion of the overall between-country het-
erogeneity. We further excluded systematic selection effects by showing that the effects
found in the poorest country in our sample, Ethiopia, carries over to a representative
sample of the rural population of that country (Vieider et al. (2018)).
In terms of country-level data, we observed both universal patterns and systematic
differences. In particular, we found the qualitative patterns of likelihood-insensitivity
and reference-dependence to be universal, albeit with some quantitative differences
between countries. Therefore, we would expect the economic phenomena related to
probability weighting and sign-dependence, such as, for example, the disposition ef-
fect, overweighting of small-probability losses in insurance choices, and many of the
anomalies observed in behavioral finance, to be universal. The most important differ-
ence between countries consisted in poorer countries showing systematically higher
levels of risk tolerance than richer countries. This finding is indeed surprising, since
scholars have to date generally assumed poor countries to be less risk tolerant based
on within-country results showing risk aversion to decrease in income or wealth (see,
e.g., Haushofer and Fehr (2014), for a recent literature review reaching that conclu-
sion).
In terms of observable characteristics, we could replicate and further qualify typi-
cal findings in the literature, such as gender effects and effects of physical height. In-
deed, while there is a considerable literature discussing the effect of such characteristics
on overall risk aversion (Croson and Gneezy (2009), Dohmen et al. (2011), Filippin and
Crosetto (2016)), we have shown that the strongest effects register in terms of reduced
sensitivity for women. We drew similar conclusions for GPA, which again was found to
correlate most strongly with sensitivity. The latter results seem in agreement with con-
clusions presented by Andersson et al. (2016), according to which cognitive ability in-
fluences mostly error terms, but shows no correlation with overall preferences if choice
lists are balanced.
This leaves the question of what may be ultimately driving the negative between-
country correlation of aggregate risk tolerance with GDP per capita. The latter may
appear puzzling in light of the prevalent finding of a positive correlation between
risk tolerance and income at the individual level (Donkers, Melenberg, and Van Soest
(2001), Dohmen et al. (2011), Gloede, Menkhoff, and Waibel (2015), Hopland, Matsen,
and Strøm (2016), Vieider et al. (2018, forthcoming)). Several recent papers have mod-
eled economic growth as a function of risk tolerance (Galor and Michalopoulos (2012),
Doepke and Zilibotti (2014), Klasing (2014)). In these models, risk preferences are en-
dogenously shaped by market forces, and the models of Galor and Michalopoulos (2012)
and Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) in particular predict the type of relationship between
risk tolerance and GDP per capita found in this paper (see Bouchouicha and Vieider
(2017b), for a detailed discussion). More research is needed in order to determine which
mechanism in particular may be driving these effects.
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